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ABSTRACT
The rule of law is often seen as a panacea for ensuring a successful, fair and modern democracy 
which enables sustainable development. However, as Makau Mutua highlights, this is not the 
case. Using the example of African states, he describes how no African country has truly 
thrown off the shackles of colonial rule and emerged as a truly just nation state – even though 
many have the rule of law at the heart of their constitutions. This, he argues, is because the 
Western concept of the rule of law cannot be simply transplanted to Africa. The concept 
must be adapted accordingly to take into account the cultural, geographic and economic 
peculiarities of each state. In order to achieve this, Mutua offers seven core values which the 
rule of law must reflect in order to achieve sustainable development across the continent.
AFRICA AND 
THE RULE OF LAW
Makau Mutua
•   The problematic rebirth of liberalism in Africa and why the rule   •
of law must be reconsidered to achieve sustainable development
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1 • Introduction
Few concepts have been as captivating as the rule of law.1 The concept stretches deep 
into antiquity and the Magna Carta. Its genius lies in the subordination of rulers to 
the law and due process. The modern democracy – which is not possible without the 
rule of law – is anchored in liberalism, the Enlightenment project, and attempts at 
the universalisation of its morality. In a historical continuum, liberalism predates and 
gives birth to political democracy which in turn is universalised in human rights. The 
common thread that runs through them is the rule of law. But the rule of law is not 
without complication and controversy. Like political democracy and human rights, 
it has endured a checkered history and been subject to profound critiques about its 
normative incompleteness, cultural blindness, Anglo-Saxon imperial complicity, and 
historical context.2 For Africa, the rule of law and related concepts offer hope and 
caution in an environment replete with extreme complexity and historical trauma. 
Distinction ought to be drawn between the “law” and the “rule of law”. The two 
terms are often conflated. Charles Dickens in Oliver Twist popularised the English 
expression “the law is an ass – an idiot.”3 The reference by Dickens was to the rigidity 
of the application of the law, not the law itself per se as an artifact. The point is that 
like the donkey, the law is rigidly stupid and obstinate in its application. Stripped 
to its bare minimum – and shorn of more modern meanings that impute human 
rights at its core – the rule of law assured fidelity and certainty to its application. 
The question was not whether the law was just or fair. It is the rule of law – not the 
law itself – that needs interrogation. Put differently, it is the language of rights – 
interpreted as the rule of law – that requires scrutiny. 
This piece accepts the common view that no viable society can exist today without a 
credible, legitimate, and widely accepted legal regime. In other words, both the law 
and the rule of law are indispensable pivots of any legitimate political society. Systems 
of arbitrary personal rule, or kleptocracies have no place in the modern world. But 
this paper argues that such a view is only anti-catastrophic and does not answer the 
challenges of powerlessness that continue to cause and exacerbate human privation. 
A system governed by the rule of law is more likely to prevent the collapse of social 
and political order but it may not address deeply embedded inequities. It may provide 
procedural justice but deny substantive social justice. Indeed, both liberal and even 
illiberal regimes are governed by the rule of law. But that is not a bar to oppression, 
exclusion, and marginalisation. This article argues that virtually all African states 
experience large gaps of legitimacy that the rule of law is unlikely to cure unless deep 
social transformation is undertaken. The medium of rights is not an adequate tool 
for human liberation. The piece identifies deficits that the rule of law could address 
but cautions against the euphoria of solely relying on the law to undo deep societal 
distortions. Ultimately, the article questions the viability of the liberal project in the 
construction of a just and humane society. It concludes that market solutions coupled 
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with income inequality and the powerlessness engendered by social alienation, exclusion, 
and other post-colonial distortions ought to give the global rule of law communities a 
pause. Thinking anew the place of the rule of law in a resurgent Africa must be done, 
but the failed models of yore should not be replanted. The rebirth of liberalism in 
Africa – if that is what Africans want – must be problematised. But that rebirth must 
deepen democracy to release the human potential of every African.
2 • Africa’s History of Trauma
Africa has young states even though it is an old continent. Perhaps no other continent 
has suffered more trauma than Africa over the last 500 years. The Arab and European/
American trade in enslaved Africans stands out for its brutality and legacy on the peoples 
of the continent. The slave trade was closely followed by the Scramble for Africa in 
which African societies, institutions, and norms were wrecked by European imperial 
powers. The plunder and theft of Africa’s resources for the benefit of the West stands 
out in the era of colonialism. Independence from colonial rule starting in the 1950s 
brought little relief as the hopes of a resurgence were consumed in the cauldron of 
the Cold War and a scandalous international economic order.4 Opaque and oppressive 
one-party states and military dictatorships proliferated the continent. African ruling 
elites failed to implant the promise of the liberal constitution and to cohere the state. 
The transition from colonialism to an independent, viable post-colonial state proved 
exceedingly challenging. Elites chose first to consolidate their own power. They stifled 
dissent, dismantled liberal constitutions, retreated to ethnic loyalties, and buttressed the 
patrimonial state.5 Corruption and crony capitalism became a culture. Infrastructures 
collapsed, societies fragmented, religious, civil, and ethnic conflicts became all too 
common. A number of states entirely collapsed.6 The transition from colonial rule to 
a viable post-colonial state proved more challenging that was expected. Building and 
sustaining state institutions – including in the justice sector – was undermined by the 
lack of internal cohesion, ethnic rivalries, cultural dissonance, and external interventions. 
Every arm of the state – executive, legislature, and judiciary – experienced contraction, 
dysfunction, or collapse. An overbearing executive was often the culprit. The men 
in power usually corralled the legislature and turned it into a rubber stamp. The 
Africanisation and indigenisation of the judiciary failed to transform the justice sector 
from a colonially racist, anti-people, and oppressive instrumentality. Judges became 
extensions of the executive and served at its whim. Instead of becoming fountains of 
justice, courts were used to instill fear in the populace at the behest of the executive. 
The courts were used to crush political dissent and curtail civil society.7 Under this 
climate it was impossible to even think of reconciling competing legal regimes within 
the state. Formal and informal justice systems – civil and common law, Muslim and 
sharia law, African dispute resolution and justice regimes, and Hindu law – co-existed 
without coordination. The result was a confused hodge-podge, a stew of legal regimes 
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in which justice was often the casualty. Legal pluralism, otherwise a source of strength 
and vibrant diversity, instead subjected citizens to often unequal, and discriminatory 
treatment. This was especially true for women and girls. As a result, courts and the 
wider legal sector were rarely viewed as legitimate institutions where citizens could seek 
justice. Judges were viewed with disdain, contempt, or fear in most African states. This 
is why today the law, courts, and the legal sector are viewed with suspicion by most 
Africans. Judiciaries are not perceived to be the guardians of legality or impartiality. To 
be sure, the illegitimacy of the justice sector extended to all the other arms of the state. 
But even with these challenges Africa has been a resilient continent. The ravages of 
the Cold War started to retreat with the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s. 
Africans arose as one to demand freer societies across the continent. Civil society was 
reborn. Political opposition found its voice and mobilised to take power. The entire 
continent, except Arab North Africa, was rocked by a wave of political liberalisation 
not seen since the Independence Decade.8 It would not be until the fall of the Ben 
Ali kleptocracy following mass protests in Tunisia that the phenomena known as the 
Arab Spring ousted one dictator after the next in Arab North Africa.9 A cauldron of 
revolutionary protests consumed long serving despots in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and 
besieged others in Syria and Bahrain. In Africa, virtually all states have given in to 
political reforms. In Africa in particular, new social compacts, usually in the form of a 
rewritten, or new constitution, became the norm. Central to the new compacts between 
the state and citizens were the key tenets of the liberal tradition. These were the rule of 
law, political democracy through multipartyism and open, contested elections, checks 
on executive power, judicial independence, separation of powers, and a guarantee of 
individual rights. This wave of remaking the African state was known as the Second 
Liberation.10 South Africa shed off Apartheid. To signal a new era, in 2001 African 
states transformed the Organization of African Unity, an organ formed to complete 
decolonisation, to the African Union (the “AU”). One of the key objectives of the AU 
spoke to this new compact. It states clearly that the AU shall “promote democratic 
principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance.”11
The last two decades have seen a steady rise in Africa’s growth in virtually every sector 
– justice, economic, social, and political. Africa today has some of the world’s fastest 
growing economies.12 To be sure, there have been horrible reversals in some states, 
and a stubbornness to crises in others. The most desperate cases are driven by the 
collapse of social order, the failure of governance, and the persistence of privation. 
But the denial of citizens of the right to map their own fate has been at the centre of 
misery in the few states that have not joined the caravan of freedom. Even in those 
states that opted for a return to political democracy within the last two decades, many 
problems persist. Social inequities, economic deprivation, discrimination along every 
cleavage, and the lack of social justice are manifest. Either democracy has not been 
deepened, or a culture of justice has not penetrated the bone marrow. Challenges to 
entrenching systems of governance that give meaning to citizenship remain. Many 
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populations are still excluded from political participation and economic opportunity. It 
is clearly not enough to write great constitutions and enact good laws. Nor do elected 
legislatures and executives automatically usher a culture of justice, or create a human 
rights state. Judiciaries remain beholden to powerful and vested interests in politics and 
the economy. Power is still concentrated within very few hands, regions, or groups. The 
rule of law – understood as adherence to good laws – is not enough of a panacea for 
Africa’s complex problems. There is no doubt that Africans must unpack the concept of 
the rule of law within a democratic polity to respond to these challenges.
3 • The Rule of Law as a Terrain of Contest
Its checkered history notwithstanding, the rule of law remains a pillar of good 
governance. It has evolved over time to contain within it the core values of human 
rights. Over time, the understanding of the concept – including its normative reach, 
scope, and content – has become more sophisticated. Soon after Africa’s independence, 
cadres of Western academics and policy-makers believed that Africa’s new states would 
be “civilised” by the rule of law. Western thought viewed pre-colonial Africa as pre-law, 
and thus argued that emergent states needed formal Western legal regimes to enter 
modernity. No credit was given to pre-existing African legal systems, which were often 
referred to as “customary law,” “traditional,” “savage,” or “uncivilised”. Such views were 
common in the colonial Church which often was practically fused to the colonial state. 
A pithy example is that of Shropshire, a British missionary in what is present-day 
Zimbabwe. He wrote of “unlettered Natives” who “were in the technically barbaric and 
pre-literary stage of cultural and social development.”13
European, or white, predestination over black, brown, or yellow peoples has a long 
history. Shropshire’s worldview was part of the fuel for the colonial project. It is a 
philosophy that grounded the civilising mission, the justification for Empire, and the 
attendant Christian conquest over “barbaric” peoples. Rudyard Kipling, the English 
poet, captured it well in the White Man’s Burden:
Take up the White Man’s burden, Send forth the best ye breed
Go bind your sons to exile, to serve your captives’ need;
To wait in heavy harness, On fluttered folk and wild—
Your new-caught, sullen peoples, Half-devil and half-child.14
Kipling was not writing about Africa here, but his exhortation of the United States of 
America to take over and civilise the Filipino natives is a classic. His command to white 
men to colonise native peoples for their benefit is a duty of the race. It is impossible 
to understand the colonial project and the movement of modernity absent Kipling’s 
worldview. Nor is it possible to comprehend the Westernisation of the Global South 
through the mediums of the modern state with the apparatuses of concepts such as the 
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rule of law and human rights.15 Much of it was a negation of existing norms – an attack 
on accumulated wisdom. It was the murder of the spirit of so-called native peoples.
This is the context in which the West viewed the rule of law in Africa during colonial 
rule and especially in the aftermath of decolonisation. These erroneous notions were 
partially fueled by another erroneous assumption – that pre-colonial Africa was devoid 
of law, or that so-called African customary law was a downwind on the African state. 
The initial law and development movement sought to implant Anglo-Saxon legal 
norms in emergent states through the establishment of law schools, the training of legal 
professionals such as judges and lawyers to support a market economy and budding 
political institutions. No attempts were made to view law in the wider social context both 
domestically and internationally. How could law be used to transform deeply embedded 
social and economic justices? Was there a difference between due process and procedural 
justice, as opposed to substantive justice? Would law play any role in freeing Africa from 
an unjust international economic order? Would the rule of law combat illiberalism or 
bad governance by rulers and elites bent on husbanding their privileges? In a word, how 
could law be used as a tool for social justice? These questions, which are central to the 
rule of law, went largely unanswered. As a result, many of the same academic proponents 
of the initial rule of law movement for development declared it a failure by the early 
1970s.16 Thereafter, the concept of the rule of law and development endured ridicule. 
Academics and policymakers realised how complex, and arduous, the process of creating 
viable and legitimate states would be. The early optimism died. Over time, there was 
realisation that rule of law understood in a more liberating idiom would play a key 
role. Thus its centrality in the rethinking and practice of social reconstruction, nation-
building, spurring economic development, and good government never went away. The 
reason is that Africans understand, and do not want to imagine, let alone live in, a 
society devoid of the rule of law. It is the meaning and practical effect of the rule of law, 
not its importance or necessity, that remains a terrain of contest. What is clear is that 
the concept is rapidly evolving and is being re-imagined by thinkers and practitioners.17 
Even so, it still has its ardent critics and fervent defenders.18
The crisis of legitimacy of the rule of law has not dimmed its star. In fact, the current 
re-imagination of the African state is not possible without the rule of law. Concepts 
of transparency and accountability – which are central to the rule of law – lie at the 
centre of efforts by civil society, the political opposition, the press, and the judiciary to 
penetrate and reform the deep state. The writing, or revision of new constitutions, place 
at the centre the use of the rule of law to promote equity and protect the citizen and her 
resources from plunder. It is the norm used to justify why power must be decongested 
– deconcentrated – from the centre and brought closer to the people. The emerging 
clamour for devolution as a legal and constitutional device to address official impunity 
and create less opacity and accountability in smaller units embeds the rule of law as one 
of its key weapons. In an era where social media makes each citizen an “eye of the people”, 
access to timely information and official documents permits the audit of the state by the 
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public. However, such an audit is not possible if government is not open and subject to 
law. The ability of marginalised communities to participate in politics and economic 
development depends on access to information. So is the delivery of services, access to 
justice, and health care. Individuals and communities are able to mobilise themselves for 
political action, or planning for development, if they can freely organise. Dialogue with, 
or protest against, local and central authorities is not possible without the rule of law. 
4 • Rethinking Development
Africa must think anew about how to address many of the deep-seated questions that 
continue to bedevil state and society. The crises facing the continent do not have easy 
solutions. The problem is not the diagnoses of the malaise, but in the prescription 
to overcome them. Two variables, which are related, are often thought to be at the 
centre of these crises. The first, and perhaps the most important, is the nature of the 
African state itself. The illegitimacy of the imposed colonial state and its resistance 
to democratisation are key reasons for its dysfunction. The African state is reflexively 
repressive and generally disdainful of civil society. It has trouble performing the basic 
functions of statehood. Its proclivity for corruption is well known. These problems 
stand at the centre of the crisis. The second variable is Africa’s relationship with 
the international legal, political, and economic order. International institutions, 
hegemonic states, and the culture of international law have at best been negligent, and 
destructive at worst. Internally, Africa has attempted to answer the first challenge by 
rewriting the constitutional order to create a more transparent and responsive state. 
This attempt to reinstitute the original liberal promise of the early post-colonial state 
has born unsteady but visible results. On the second challenge, which is external, 
Africa has become more assertive with a resurgent economy. 
The problem of development – underdevelopment – has been a major challenge for 
Africa. Different global, continental, and national initiatives have been tried. While 
there have been some successes, no one can dispute the persistence of poverty even in 
the best endowed and most developed countries on the continent. Large populations 
continue to live in dire poverty. Inequality, discrimination, and violations of the most 
basic human rights are endemic. Bad governance and corruption eat away at the fabric 
of society. Some global initiatives, such as the much-touted Millennium Development 
Goals (the “MDGs”), have come and gone. While the MDGs were laudable, and 
some progress was made under them, the overall record has been mixed. Some critics 
argued that the MDGs were vague and lacked sufficient input from the Global South.19 
The legitimacy of the MDGs was questioned. Critics charged that the constituencies 
targeted by MDGs were treated as passive recipients, not actors with agency. Neither 
the rule of law, nor human rights, were explicit in the agenda.20 It is now clear that 
accountability and transparency – nationally and internationally – are essential to 
meaningfully transform societies. The post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (the 
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SDGs), a more refined global initiative, seeks to remedy some of the deficits of the 
MDGs. Will the SDGs do for Africa what the MDGs could not?
Unlike the MDGs, the SDGs have a more expansive and exhaustive catalogue of 
goals that span the entire scope of the human condition.21 The essential elements 
in all the goals are equity, sustainability, inclusivity, transparency, empowerment, 
access, and equality. Of all the SDGs, Goal 16 comes closest to articulating a rule of 
law agenda in the context of development. It calls for the promotion of “peaceful and 
inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and 
build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”. The key language 
– “provide access to justice for all” – recognises that sustainable development is not 
possible without functioning and effective institutions to dispense justice without 
fear or favor to every person. This is the essence of the rule of law. The rule of law is 
not simply a totem of democracy, but an integral and core element in every aspect of 
human development. Although it has historically been associated – wrongly – with 
only civil and political rights, the rule of law is indispensable for the realisation of 
economic, social, and cultural rights. The segregation of the two cannons of human 
rights was not a labour of the intellect, but a necessity of politics. That is why the 
chasm of both sets of rights cannot be watertight, and must be collapsed in any true 
development initiative. This is particularly true for Africa where the violations of 
one cannon of rights (civil and political rights) is a direct result of the denial of the 
other (economic and social rights). A dynamic understanding of the law of law in 
Africa cannot be limited to legal formality and procedure. It must have as its core 
norm a rejection of oppressive vested property and market interests that use the law 
to protect ill-gotten wealth and an unjust economic order. Social and substantive 
justice must be a mission of the rule of law. 
5 • Beyond Traditional Liberalism
Development is not a linear process that can be reproduced from country to country. 
In fact, the contrary is true. Transplanted models of development and politics have 
fared very poorly in Africa. There is ample evidence, empirical and otherwise, that 
the traditional tools of the formulaic liberal state are not a panacea for Africa’s ills.22 
Africa cannot adopt undigested liberal theories of the state reconstruction if it hopes 
to benefit from some of the most compelling values.23 It must identify and rethink 
many normative tenets of liberalism and thus the rule of law. This is necessary to 
respond to the particular historical challenges and cultural context of the African 
landscape. Thus the rule of law cannot be exported to Africa ready-made. The rule 
must be divorced from its imperialist origins and uses.24 Africans need to identify and 
isolate those thematic, normative, and sectoral areas most likely to be impacted the 
most by the language of rights, and use the rule of law to transform them. Many of 
them are overarching and cross-cutting. The core values are: integrity, transparency, 
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accountability, equity, equality, access, and participation. No sustainable development 
– which gives citizenship meaning and every citizen a sense of belonging and allows a 
culture of justice – is possible without them. Simply put, the rule of law is meaningless 
without each of these core values which must be addressed in the followings ways:
1 – Devolution 
It is unarguable that a thorough reform of the state and its institutions is a condition 
that is required for development to occur. A key problem has been the concentration of 
power in the executive, and the concentration of that power in the hands of the head of 
state. This arrangement begot the patrimonial state and bred impunity and corruption. 
Power must be decongested and devolved to smaller units within the state. But power 
should be understood as both political and economic. Thus devolved units must have 
the ability to plan and expend resources in a locally participatory process. This makes 
locally elected officials accountable at the grassroots. But care must be taken that the 
corrupt practices at the centre are not just simply devolved to local powerbrokers. Nor 
should the local units engage in practices of exclusion and marginalisation along gender, 
religion, ethnic, or other cleavages. Devolution of power and resources is therefore one 
of the most effective devices for creating the conditions for sustainable development. 
The true devolution of power brings government closer to the people because it creates 
opportunities for popular participation in the projects and institutions of governance, 
including actors in the justice sector. Done correctly, devolution demystifies the courts 
and makes justice tangible to citizens. Devolution in this imagination goes beyond 
process – it is consequentialist and concerned with substantive outcomes and outputs in 
social justice. Devolution can be a safety valve for ethnic grievances in fractured societies 
because it permits a degree of regional, or ethnic autonomy, without weakening the 
central state, or turning into full-blown federalism. It can enhance national cohesion 
and give pre-colonial loyalties a reason to embrace the post-colonial state to create a 
national consciousness. In Africa, where virtually every state is hodge-podge of distinct 
pre-colonial ethno-political societies forced together by the colonial cartographer,25 
devolution serves the purpose of forging a common national identity.
2 – Transparency
This is an unarguable condition which is required for inclusive and participatory 
political and economic development. Without it, any meaningful notion of the rule of 
law, or a culture of justice, would be a mirage. State brutality, impunity, and corruption 
grow where the state is opaque. Information about government resources and how they 
are spent is essential. This requires institutions of oversight at the local and national 
levels and an unfettered press. Citizen participation in planning – akin to the traditional 
African baraza (public open-air meeting) – allows communities to claim their own 
development and gives meaning to their agency. This is especially true, for example, in 
the context of the exploitation of mineral and natural resources.
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3 – Equity and social justice
These are indispensable to social stability and development. One of the most 
underdeveloped sectors in African states is the justice sector. Traditionally, judiciaries 
have been beholden to the executive and corrupt private business interests.26 Courts 
of law are often not fountains of justice.27 Judges are regularly for sale, and lawyers 
facilitate the corrupt deals. Large segments of the population that cannot buy justice 
have no access to the courts. Women and the poor, often the largest segments of the 
population, are shut out. It is not unusual for litigants to wait for a decade before 
a case is heard. Lack of access to justice is compounded by the paucity of courts 
in rural areas where the majority of Africa lives. Yet this is where courts are most 
needed to settle land disputes and protect the vulnerable such as women who are often 
disinherited, or subjected to severe exclusion. These conditions create an angry and 
impoverished population incapable of playing any meaningful part in development. 
Such marginalised populations cannot defend themselves or take part in the practices 
and ceremonies of political democracy. These conditions hollow citizenship out. The 
answer to these dire conditions is to re-establish the institutions of justice and retrain 
people working in the judicial sector. There are many examples in Africa where the 
successful recreation of the justice sector is already underway. Access to justice must 
be an end in itself. But a re-imagination of the justice sector cannot reify the judiciary, 
or forget to integrate and treat with dignity so-called alternative justice systems. Legal 
pluralism is a fact of most African states, but the most neglected legal regimes, such 
as sharia law and African dispute resolution mechanisms, affect millions. A reform 
of the sector needs to regularise these systems and bring them within the purview of 
public law while at the same time cross-breeding their most liberating norms with the 
common or civil law systems. 
4 – Culture of governance
Or put differently, the culture and style of politics. In Africa, the culture of governance 
weighs heavily on the state. Political power is remote from the people. Those who carry 
the instruments of the state expect to be feared, not just respected. Public officials are 
masters, not servants of the people. This construction of public power goes against every 
norm of democratic governance. It stifles citizens, kills dissent, and dulls the public. It 
puts the state at perpetual loggerheads with the people. It creates deep distrust in the 
population towards public authority. This culture of dictatorship has been identified 
by Africans as the greatest hurdle to sustainable development. It breeds impunity and 
runaway corruption. It is unaccountable. The arrogance of power facilitates the theft 
of public resources and condones the violations of basic human rights. Great strides 
to unpack this phenomenon have been made in the last two decades. Intellectually, 
Africans know that this indefensible culture is the bane of the state. The African press in 
every country is awash with incident after incident of unacceptable conduct by public 
officials and their business acolytes. It is a culture that must be directly interrogated 
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and publicly confronted. Africa will not advance unless these colonial-era mentalities 
of governance are banished from public life.
5 – Women and citizenship
Gender remains among the thorniest challenges to the rule of law and development. A 
poisonous mix of culture, colonial-era laws, and religious practices have conspired to 
consign women and girls to the margins of society. Their exclusion from public life is 
a stunning fact of African existence. The privation of African women – from domestic 
violence to exclusions on property ownership are well known. The facts haunt the 
human conscience. Yet some women have been resurgent of late with many joining 
the professions, as business entrepreneurs, and within the corridors of public power. 
But gender biases persist, and those who have escaped marginalisation are but a tiny 
few. There is consensus that actual and sustainable development will not occur unless 
women are not only included, but play a manifestly public role. The concept of the rule 
of law must be transformed by theories of insubordination and multidimensionality – 
recent understanding of gender and powerlessness that unpacks the complex ways in 
which multiple identities subject a group to layers of oppression and exclusion.28
6 – Women and Migrants
Another population that is excluded – and often abused – is migrant labour. Though 
not citizens in the classic sense, many migrant workers have settled permanently in 
their host countries. Many of these migrants are also women who suffer doubly because 
of their gender and alienage. As South Africa has demonstrated with recent shocking 
xenophobic attacks – migrant workers often bear the brunt of the anger generated by 
the lack of social justice and inequitable development.29 This category of the population 
is disposed in similar ways like women. However, migrant workers are a norm in Africa. 
That is why any discussion of the rule of law should not exclude migrant workers, 
immigrants, and refugee populations in Africa.
7 – Land ownership, access, and reform
Even though the last four decades have seen a historic surge of Africans moving to urban 
areas, the largest African populations still live in rural areas. Agriculture remains the 
backbone of African economies, even where mineral wealth is abundant. Land, in a word, 
remains the surest source of wealth and livelihood. And yet land ownership – and access – 
remains highly exclusive, inequitable, and a great source of conflict. No issue is more volatile 
in Africa. Land is the source of water, pastures for livestock, and the basis of Africa’s family 
economy. But large populations have historically been excluded from land ownership, or 
access to land. Much of the alienation from land is traceable to colonial expropriation – and 
evictions of so-called “natives” from their ancestral lands. These historical injustices have 
largely been uncorrected by successor regimes. They are the source of many clan, inter-
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ethnic, and inter-communal conflicts. Successor regimes oftentimes exacerbated alienation 
by allocating land formerly owned by colonialists to favored ethnic elites, or cabals and 
cartels close to the regime. Land is a powder keg in Africa. The cases of Zimbabwe, 
South Africa, Kenya, and virtually most African states attest to land policies fraught with 
challenge and often catastrophe. This is complicated by the exclusion of women from land 
ownership, although they are the ones who are primary tillers of land. The law has been a 
diligent and faithful servant to corrupt cartels that illegally “grab” land often with fake or 
forged documents.30 The rule of law as a vehicle for equitable development must address 
land as a key bottleneck to Africa’s stability and growth.
8 – Africa and the world
No discussion of Africa’s development is complete without an exploration of the 
continent’s relationship with the outside world. Much of that history is tortured, but 
there are many positive aspects of it. Ali Mazrui, the renowned Kenyan intellectual, 
spoke of the richness and paradox of this phenomenon as “Africa’s triple heritage”,31 
a reference to the complex alchemy of Africa, Europe, and the Muslim world in 
Africa’s identity. External forces have both ravaged and enriched Africa. But it is the 
inequitable structure and disequilibrium between Africa and the world that needs to be 
addressed as an integral part of Africa’s march towards a greater global destiny. Africa’s 
voice in shaping and influencing international norms, institutions, and practices needs 
to be enhanced. Inequity in international markets and biases towards Africa must be 
eradicated. A new global order without superiors and subordinates – where Africa sits 
at the bottom – must be one of the primary outcomes of the SDGs. This is a large 
conversation covering trade, geopolitics, migration, and defence. 
6 • Conclusion
The difficult South African experiment with democracy is proof that using rights discourse 
alone without a deep restructuring of the political economy can exacerbate powerlessness 
among the most vulnerable populations.32 Law does not exist in a vacuum. Nor can law 
and rights language by themselves transform society. But what is unarguable is that no 
society can achieve sustainable development without infusing in its mainstream a culture 
of justice grounded in the core norms of the rule of law. However, these core norms 
must grapple with Africa’s unique history and be adopted to its historical circumstances 
to achieve cultural legitimacy. Even more important, the rights language and the bed 
of political democracy, on which it rests, cannot be swallowed by Africa unchewed. 
Otherwise, the rebirth of the liberal project will die again – on the vine. 
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